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CRISES IN A TRANSFORMING INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM

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Advanced Research Projects Agency

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S/N 0102-014-6601

PRICES SUBJECT TO CHANGE

Crises in a Transforming International System

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January, 1975

TR&A Technical Report #24
Threat Recognition and Analysis Project

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II

Introduction

An International crisis, however defined or conceptualized, generates serious stress with which decision makers must cope. Distinguished from other international phenomena by its high levels of threat and surprise, and relatively short decision time, a crisis is the perfect setting for mishap, miscalculation, accidental war, unanticipated consequences and disaster. (C. Hermann,1972: 13-14). All of the ingredients necessary for bridging the peace-war gap are embodied in a crisis. Crisis situations spawn international stresses which provoke the restraints on total conflict. In a crisis conflict thresholds become tenuous and highly susceptible to violation.

Under the stress of a crisis, decision makers face conditions of appreciable ambiguity and uncertainty. Previously acceptable policy guidelines are suddenly called into question, or are confused (Sigal, 1970: 133-149; Halperin and Tsou, 1966). Problems of accessibility to information, information accuracy and quantity, information processing and analysis become acute and disruptive (Jervis, 1970: 90-138; Janis, 1967). Perplexing problems arise when attempts are made to define and clarify the situation (Pruitt, 1965; Hoisti, 1970). Tactics for coping with the crisis become uncertain (Whaley, 1973); commitments to allies, and assessments of an opponent's commitments to its allies turn into policy and intelligence quandries (Clay, 1950: 359; Murphy, 1964: 312-313; Wohlstetter, 1962). Important clues which should serve to alert decision makers to adverse futures are ignored, misread or misunderstood (Wohlstetter, 1965: 699, 701: Allison, 1971; U.S. Congressional Hearings, 1946: part 22, 527). As the crisis gains momentum whatever clarity existed initially about the relationship between the antagonists, the motives, capabilities and the ends risk being badly distorted.

Viewed as a turning point, especially a transition between peace and war (Wiener and Kahn, 1962; Schelling, 1966: 96-97; Young, 1968: 10; 1968: 6-24; McClelland, 1972: 83; Snyder, 1972: 218), a crisis is the most dramatic clue in the flow of international events anticipating a future condition of total conflict. A crisis specifically foreshadows a conflict, currently not present, at some indefinite time in the future which is more violent and more encompassing. It heralds a future condition of widespread disruption and chaos; it threatens a confrontation where the antagonists engage in an engulfing and destructive conflict. Hence, a crisis not only is threatening (C. Hermann, 1972), but it threatens even more undesirable events to come.

International crises are, therefore, threat situations (McClelland, 1974: 7 ff.) which generate stresses national decision makers must cope with to avert the anticipated state of comprehensive violence. Decision makers eliminate, reduce or redirect the international stresses by identifying, adopting and implementing policies controlling those factors tending to exacerbate the conflict toward total violence. Though this sounds like a purely "minimizing of violence" activity it should not be so construed. National policy planners certainly may adopt coping strategies employing higher levels of violence to avoid a future condition of undesirability. Frequently this is done under the guise of terminating the conflict more rapidly. Notable examples are Truman's decision to use nuclear weapons against Japan to stave off an extended Asian war at the end of World War II, (and probably also to satisfy the promises made to Stalin at Yalta), Johnson's escalation of the Vietnam war, and recently Nixon's "Operation Linebacker II", the decision to bomb Hanoi and the rest of North Vietnam on December 18, 1973. (Northedge and Grieve, 1971: 254; Ellsberg, 1971; Szulc, 1974: 61-62). Or it may be the case that coping mechanisms relying on higher levels of coercive force are chosen because national values are so threatened by external events that no other recourse seems feasible. On this point Whiting has speculated that the Chinese Communists saw the hardening United States' policy on Formosa and Korea as casting doubt on Washington's declared policy of limited objectives (Whiting, 1960: 6-8). Peking's intervention in Korea was apparently a coping mechanism utilizing greater coercive power to avert a future adverse state, namely a condition where the U.S. would make further encroachments against Chinese territory after conquering North Korea or at the very least export Chinese domestic dissension.

The prime consideration here is to investigate how national systems cope with a highly dynamic threat situation like an international crisis. Specifically the interest is to examine the sequence of coping strategies designed to handle the stresses generated by an unfolding international crisis in its pre-confrontation stages. It is assumed that crises typically evolve out of the sequential interaction of national actors, rather than from domestic sources. It is a process that emerges, or builds-up. The components of a crisis are inherent in the international setting before the "wall" is ever erected, or the missiles discovered. Instantaneous flare-ups, disputes without some early warnings are rare. Consequently it is maintained that along the path to an international crisis of major proportions are tracks; detectable tell-tale signs in the "performance

characteristics" of nations which reveal a pre-crisis trajectory in their interactions. The question to be determined is what do pre-confrontation interactions between antagonists look like? Exactly what are the behavioral manifestations of national systems during a pre-crisis period (that is, the period preceding the confrontation characterizing a full-fledged crisis)? What similarities or differences are there in the international stresses and coping strategies selected to manage them across different crises?

International crises, though fairly recurrent international phenomena, are never exactly the same. One crisis is clearly not a replica of its predecessors or successors. Each varies with regard to issue, participants, the international environment, national and personal capabilities, ends, motives, geographic location, history or background to the dispute, escalation tempo, initiation, levels of constraint on coercion and many other factors. Classification schemes are multiple and wide-ranging. Despite this condition the assumption to be tested is that pre-crisis interaction sequences, especially the coping mechanisms adopted to respond to the different stresses, have regularity and pattern which anticipate a more extensive confrontation to come some time in the future. Justification for such an assumption has been advanced many times before (McClelland, 1961; 1964; 1966; 1968a; 1968b; 1968c; Bales, 1951; Tanter, 1972: 13-17). Treated as an emerging threat situation, the pre-confrontation phase of interaction can be defined by a simple ratio of threat situations (stresses) to the means (coping strategies) for meeting the threat (Withey, 1962. 110). Actions taken by national systems bearing on the same, or related issues, are incompatible or at least are perceived as incompatible, when they obstruct, prevent, interfere with, injure, portend greater dislocations in the future, or otherwise disrupt the respective behavior or objectives of the potential protagonists.

These incompatibilities are international stresses; they may involve actual or anticipated physical injury, pain or death; disruption in the normalcy of international relations; constrained and/or impoverished conditions leading to deprivation. Under these conditions pressures are produced to resolve the discrepancies (Schon, 1971: 187-190). Stresses mount to affect a change in policy necessary to accommodate the incompatibilities. When successive changes in policy fail to adjust the incompatibilities,--that is to reduce the ratio between the threat situation to the means for coping with it,-- the

probability of the threatened confrontation increases. With the increase in the probability of a confrontation comes an increasing reliance on coercive coping strategies. Though the general circumstances of the pre-crisis phase are involved and highly complex, the presumption is that the stress and coping sequence is traceable; to use McClelland's phrase, the sequence leaves "tracks." The analytic task, is to identify the most iterative sequences common to the pre-confrontation phase across cases, and to isolate those sequences as indicators of future crises.

New Forces: A Transforming International System

International crises are well investigated phenomena. Case studies abound and empirical studies continue to proliferate (Hermann, 1972). But what makes the topic fresh and demanding renewed attention is the political transitions taking place currently in the international system. Political fluidity, Oran Young says, "frequently evoke an air of political expectancy which creates in decision makers a psychological receptivity to the possibility of sharp breaks with the past. In this context crises often appear as short but intense confrontations growing out of a merging in space and time of disturbances just outlined." (1968: 63). Crises attend disturbances in the system; they are products of, as well as catalysts for, international dislocations. Current international political conditions are extremely fluid, transitory, and potentially crisis-provoking. It appears 1974 is an important axial point in the re-configuration of power and influence among the international actors. Within the context the forecast offered here is that there will be an increasing tendency for political crises during this period of political instability. The expectation is the forthcoming decade will be dotted with political crises as the system works out its new alignments.

To be sure these crises will vary with respect to participants, issues, geographic location, tempo, intensity, constraints on violence and other characteristics. The pressures of the oil crisis, the food crisis, the international monetary crisis, the changing character of the strategic arms race, the precarious nature of the international economy, global inflation, natural resources scarcity, worldwide pollution, alterations in the status of underdeveloped nations, international terrorism, the changing relationship between multinationals and their host and mother countries, chronic trade imbalances, the public confidence crisis, and the apparent declining capacity of national governments to cope with their problems are

extremely   unsettling.   It   is   anticipated   that   these
international   stresses,   if unabated, will entangle members
of   the   international   system   in a succession of political
upheavels   of   significant   proportion.   These   "new forces"
(Brown,   1974)   justify   a   renewed   interest   in   political
crises.   Each   has   surfaced   in   one   way   or   another as a
critical   political   issue. It can be expected that these new
forces   will continue to figure in the major disputes in the
next   few   years.   Present conditions forebode a future with
more   intense   international   stresses in the face of waning
capacity to cope (Laqueur, 1974).

The expectation is that these forces will generate with
ever increasing frequency political crises. By illustration,
Gelb and Lake have recently observed that international food
aid   was   hardly a major political issue in Washington until
1973   (1974:   176).   Customarily   the   USDA   determines crop
availability   and   establishes   stock   reserves   to maintain
domestic   prices. The Secretary of Agriculture selects which
food   stuffs   should   be   exported.   Congress   passes   price
support legislation, while the State Department and AID make
decisions   on   the   questions   of   foreign   need   and
political-diplomatic   advantages   in aiding selected foreign
allies.   But   in   1973,   the   cohesive factors holding their
routinized   system   together   eroded   because   world   hunger
reached   crisis   proportions.   Gelb   and   Lake   assert: "The
availability   of   food   for   food   aid   was not the problem.
American   farmers   were   producing record crops. The problem
was   that   food aid was now trapped in the web of inflation,
concern about balance of payments, and pressures to cut back
on   government   spending. It was also being squeezed because
of   its   direct   impact   on   the   American   consumer. As
Administration   officials   argued,   it was hard to visualize a
more   inflationary   program   than   PL-480--   shipping scarce
resources out of the country." (Gelb and Lake, 1974: 177).

Kissinger's   speech   before   a   special   meeting of the
United   Nations General Assembly elevated the food aid issue
to   full   diplomatic-political   stature.   The   Secretary's
remarks   on   the   food   crisis   were couched in terms of the
general   natural   resource   shortages   problem. He made some
initial   warnings   to oil producers and the declaration that
American   food   prices   were   increasing.   But the principal
thrust of the speech was the American pledge to make a major
effort   to   ward   off   more universal starvation and famine.
Later   before   the   World Food Conference in Rome, Kissinger
extended his remarks on the food crisis.

We meet to address man's most fundamental need. The threat of famine, the fact of hunger, have haunted men and nations throughout history. Our presence here is recognition that this eternal problem has now taken on unprecedented scale and urgency and that it can only be dealt with by concerted worldwide action....

We must act now and we must act together to regain control over our shared destiny. Catastrophe when it cannot be foreseen can be blamed on a failure of vision or on forces beyond our control. But the current trend is obvious and the remedy is within our power. If we do not act boldly, disaster will result from a failure of will; moral culpability will be inherent in our foreknowledge. The political challenge is straightforward: Will the nations of the world cooperate to confront a crisis which is both self-evident and global in nature? Or will each nation or region or bloc see its special advantages as a weapon instead of as a contribution? Will we pool our strengths and progress together, or test our strengths and sink together? (Kissinger, 1974f)

Raised to the level of political sensitivity, these issues become new international stressors. In varying degrees and formats each issue has the potential, like the oil crisis, of causing dramatic changes in the system. Scant knowledge is available about what consequences these changes could have, but there is every reason to believe that the pressure to use coercive diplomacy, when conflicts of interest become more intense (Seabury, L.A. Times, Sunday, Dec. 8, 1974) will increase along with the probability of acute crises.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has been particularly consistent and cogent about the profound political changes taking place in the international system. The Secretary is certainly not without his critics (Schaetzel, 1973: 66-74; Hoffmann, 1973: 3-6; Hoffmann, 1972b; Brzezinski, 1973: 714-718) who principally argue that Dr. Kissinger, though he may perceive accurately the system's transformation, is responding in very traditional ways incapable of accomodating the new stresses.

Even so, Kissinger has repeatedly made reference to the changing character of the international system. Before the Council on World Affairs in New Delhi on October 28, 1974,

Kissinger outlined his view of the "new world." The central features of this new system are its economic interdependence, complexity and universal aspiriations. Held together by the speed of communication and the "spectre" of nuclear war, he asserted the world had undergone profound changes. These changes "signified the transition from a bipolar world locked into confrontation and seemingly destined for some final encounter to the new world of dispersed power and reduced tension." (Kissinger, 1974e: 1). The American view of global affairs has appreciably altered because of these changes. It is obvious the Secretary views detente as a response to global complexity. He considers it as an operational response (coping strategy) to the "political lesson" of the current age: namely, --"that national interest can no longer be defined or attained in isolation from the global interest, and the moral challenge of our age is to free ourselves from the narrow perception of the nation state and to shape a conception of global community." (Kissinger, 1974e: 1).

Threats of economic disaster, environmental erosion and widespread starvation and famine are universal and confront leaders around the world with the necessity of adopting truly cooperative foreign policies. These are not conventional political problems; high politics has customarily been restricted to the classical security problem where an advantage for one party could be conceived of as a disadavantage for the other. The new sources of political tension revolve around issues where a gain for one nation does not come at the expense of another.

Kissinger recognizes, however, that a transition from conventional diplomacy to global cooperation and national restraint will not be "effortless." The United States and its allies as well as its antagonists will undoubtedly experience significiant trauma in adopting new "views of right and wrong, of the possible and the ideal...." (Kissinger, 1974e: 2). Nevertheless, the Secretary envisages an unprecedented crisis if the nations of the world do not cope with their common threat situations through collective diplomacy.

The traditional agenda of international affairs-- the balance among major powers, the security of nations- no longer defines our perils or our possibilities. To some extent we have mastered many of the familiar challenges of diplomacy. Yet suddenly we are witnessing a new threat to the governability of national societies and to the structure of international stability. A

crisis threatens the world's economic system. The
industrialized nations see decades of prosperity
in jeopardy; the developing countries see hopes
for development and progress shattered or
postponed indefinitely. And even the newly wealthy
oil producers are beginning to perceive that their
gains will be swept away in a global crisis....

Tagore wrote with foresight: 'During the
evolution of the nation the moral culture of
brotherhood was limited by geographic boundaries,
because at that time those boundaries were true.
Now they have become imaginary lines of tradition
divested of the real obstacles. So the time has
come when man's moral nature must deal with this
fact with all seriousness or perish.'

The time has come for nations to act on this
vision... (Kissinger, 1974e: 5, 8).

In one form or another the Secretary has repeated the
themes of interdependence, collective action, universal
threats of nuclear war, economic collapse, declining energy,
adequate food supplies, eroding environmental quality,
population problems, improper use and management of the
seabed, and growing governmental inability to cope with
national disasters (Kissinger, 1973; 1974a; 1974b; 1974c;
1974d; 1974e; 1974f; 1974g). Dr. Kissinger's concern is that
traditional concepts and current policies are lagging far
behind the perils of the day. This is further compounded by
his expectation that international peace and security
depends not so much on managing the present crises of
"inflation, fuel, and food," but on resolving them.

Before the 29th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly on September 23, 1974 the Secretary of State
contended:

The delicate structure of international
cooperation, so laboriously constructed over the
last quarter century, can hardly survive-- and
certainly cannot be strengthened-- if it is
continually subjected to the shocks of political
conflict, war, and economic crisis.

The time has come, then, for the nations
assembled here to act together on the recognition
that continued reliance on old slogans and
traditional rivalries will lead us toward:

--A world ever more torn between rich and poor; East and West, producer and consumer;

--A world where local crises threaten global confrontation and where the spreading atom threatens global peril;

--A world of rising costs and dwindling supplies of growing populations and declining production. President Ford dedicated our country to a cooperative, open approach to build a more secure and more prosperous world. The United States will assume the obligations that our values and strength impose upon us.

But the building of a cooperative world is beyond the grasp of any one nation. An interdependent world requires not merely the resources but the vision and creativity of us all. Nations cannot simultaniously confront and cooperate with one another.

We must recognize that the common interest is the only valid test of the national interest.

It is in the common interest, and thus in the interest of each nation:

--That local conflicts be resolved short of force and their root causes by political means;

--That the spread of nuclear technology be achieved without the spread of nuclear weapons;

--That growing economic interdependence lift all nations and not drag them down together.

We will not solve these problems during this session, or any one session, of the General Assembly.

But we must at least begin:

--To remedy problems, not just manage them;

--To shape events, rather than endure them;

--To confront our challenges instead of one another (Kissinger, 1974d: 2).

Following his boss' lead, Winston Lord, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, has also addressed himself to the issue of a changing international system. Naturally Lord's ideas deal explicitly with redefining American foreign policy in a new and "ambiguous" age. Lord's assessment of the profound changes in the international system is that the United States must confront the fact that she can neither escape the world through isolation, nor dominant it with its preeminent power. Consequently, he asserts, "America is destine to cope with a shrinking planet of dispersed power, diverse goals, and interdependent economies." (Lord, 1974: 1). Given that (1) most American allies have regained their strength and self-confidence, (2) the ideological conflict with Communist states has diminished, (3) U.S. nuclear superiority has retreated in favor of parity and the specter of proliferation, and (4) national prosperity hangs on the stability and well-being of the world economy, the U.S. is forced to re-evaluate its purposes.

Post World War II alliances, Lord argues, were formed when America was clearly the dominate power, Communist expansion was a universal threat, and economic growth was assumed. Today's emerging reality is fundamentally different. The U.S. does not maintain a position of unequivocal dominance among its allies. Europe is seeking a new unity and strength; Japan has a prominence in the international system independent of its major Western ally; and even Latin America is enjoying a new sense of autonomy. These changes are sufficient to require a redefinition of the Western alliance. A new molding is necessary if the alliance can expect to persist as a viable force in the future.

Lord sees the decline of ideology as a positive trend in world politics. He is not totally convinced that Communist states will not act like revolutionary movements some time in the future, but for the moment they appear to be assuming their proper role as world powers rather than revolutionaries. The United States has matured in its attitude toward the domestic structures of foreign powers. It is unlikely that America can force a change in a state's internal political structure, but by reducing international tensions there is hope for a transformation. The United States is learning, however slowly, to deal with states on the basis of their foreign policies and not their domestic politics. Certainly fragmentation in the Communist bloc, the emergent parity in the strategic balance and new economic incentives between the East and West have contributed markedly to a decline in ideological contests.

While there is no doubt that national security, viewed
in traditional terms, must be perpetuated-- "a strong
national defense stretches ahead for as far as we can see"--
present conditions suggest power is harder to define and
establish. Accordingly, Lord contends, "Once, political,
military, and economic power were closely related. But in
the modern world additional armament cannot always be
translated into additional political leverage; economic
giants can be politically weak; countries can exert
political influence without possessing either military
strength or economic might. Power is spread more diffusely
across the globe, and its use is more complex" (Lord, 1974:
9-10).

Together with many other observers of contemporary
affairs, Lord sees global interdependence as the newest
reality and a force transcending political boundaries and
ideologies. It links nation states to one anothers' fates.
Breakdowns in economic sectors trigger domestic instability
and challenge the fragile structure of the international
system. Easy choices, vast surplus, endless supplies, low
rates of inflation, unlimited growth rates are gone. The
critical question remains whether concepts for grappling
with these issues together with the necessary capacity and
will to act even exist? "What is at stake is mankind's faith
that man still shapes his future" (Lord, 1974: 14).

Outsiders are not convinced the bureaucracy and the
"lords" of foreign policy formulation accurately perceive
the shifting nature of the international system, despite
what they say. In a book aimed primarily, though not
exclusively, at statesman and bureaucrats, Seyom Brown has
called attention to the "cracks in the plaster." Brown's
work is a thoughtful, policy-oriented study designed to show
the general erosion of the cold war coalitions and the
nation state system. He reasons that these structures have
been so influential in the past, that the consequences of
their breakup are likely to be severe and extremely
destabilizing. The policies of "pragmatic marginalism"
(Brown's phrase for describing the tendency of policy makers
to deal with those specific problems "clearly within reach
with capabilities readily at hand") and conservatism will
not be capable of coping with the volatility of a changing
world system.

Brown rejects the position taken by Walter Laqueur and
others that nothing really has changed and that cold war
antagonisms are as active as ever (Laqueur, 1972a; 1972b;
1972c; 1973). A counter-position is advanced which argues
that the premises upon which NATO and the WARSAW coalitions

were   formed are no longer as salient as they once were. The
military security issue is being fragmented. The value of
military allies to deter aggression is receding; there is a
growing   awareness   that   policy goals can be pursued
independently of a strong cohesive military coalition;
while, the costs for maintaining military forces overseas
are outstripping their relative value. (On the status of
U.S. troops in Europe see Taylor, 1974: 588). East-West
relations are depolarizing and nonmilitary issues are
producing growing tensions among the allies (Harrison, 1972;
Uberdorfer, 1972; Halmgren, 1970-71: 125-126; Shuster, 1973;
Lewis, 1973). Both the Atlantic alliance and the Soviet bloc
are undergoing significant stress and strain.

It has become evident to statesmen on both
sides of the Atlantic and in Japan that the tight
alliance pattern of the 1950s is unsustainable,
and even the looser relationship of the 1960s is
coming apart on many issues. Hore and more the
coalition is being transformed into a vast web of
intersecting   adversary   and   cooperative
relationships. And it is this latter feature that
progressively   defines   and   sets   the   tone of
international   politics   outside   the   communist
sphere....

In the sum, it appears that important cultural
and economic currents running through Eastern
Europe are undermining the hierarchical basis of
the Soviet coalition and in so doing are
increasing the costs to the Kremlin of maintaining
tight control. In the main, these costs take the
form of the demoralization of the most creative
and productive elements within the communist
world, which in the long run could affect the
balance of power on which the physical security of
the Soviet Union itself finally depends.
Increasingly the Soviet leadership is therefore
faced with the profound dilemma of balancing
immediate control against real power over the long
term (Brown, 1974: 44, 65).

The saliency of the ideological conflict between East
and West is declining. The strains that characterized the
1950s and '60s are being modified by economic incentives
(Patolichev, 1970: 6-7) between America and the Soviet
Union, and the newly established relationship with mainland
China. But while East-West relations are depolarizing,
North-South stresses are being aggravated. Brown fully
expects these tensions will be exacerbated further in the

years   to   come.   Pressures from   the   strain   of   over-
population,   industrialization,   environmental   quality,
declining   energy   and   natural   resources   will continually
frustrate   the   relationships   between   the   haves   and   the
have-nots.

The   central   thesis   of this portion of Brown's argument
is   that   these   changes   will produce a new system of world
politics.

The   particular   characteristics   of   the emerging
system cannot be forecast with confidence, just as
the   adult   behavior patterns of a child cannot be
predicted.   Tendencies   can be observed from which
potential   courses of development can be inferred;
but   which   main   course   will   be taken, and then
which   subsequent paths, is highly contingent upon
unpredictable   environmental   and   internal events
(Brown, 1974: 109).

Though forecasts are difficult, Brown envisages the emerging
system   will   be   one of "multiple coalitions" dependent on
cross-cutting   interdependencies.   The   consequences of this
interdependency   can   be benign or extremely threatening and
disruptive.   Which   pattern   evolves   is   contingent   on how
statesmen   cope   with   the   confusing situation facing them.
Despite   his   uncertainty   about   what   the future will look
like,   Brown   is positive that the traditional coalitions of
the cold war are disintegrating.

Concomitant   with   the   disintegration   of   cold   war
alignments   and the emergence of multiple interdependencies,
there   are   pressures   challenging   the nation-state system.
Dissolving   the   state   arguments   are   fairly common in the
literature   (Wagner,   1974:   435-466; Keohane and Nye, 1972;
Frohlich,   Oppenheimer   and   Young,   1971).   International
stresses   such   as   technology,   economic   transnationalism,
cosmopolitanism   (meaning   low   identification with national
allegiancies), affluent alienation (meaning rejection of the
prevailing   cultural   norms   and   the   adoption   of
"countercultures")   and   ethnicity   (the   eroding   force   of
nationhood itself) are producing a crisis in the established
political   order   of the nation-state system. The primacy of
the   nation-state   as   the   principal   actor   in the current
system   is   under attack. Political order is suspect and the
possibilities for violence measurably increased as actors in
the   system   vie   for   status   and   prestige,   and   seek new
relationships and rules for behavior.

These   processes,   that   is the disintegration of cold war

alignments and the decline of the nation-state system, are trends anticipating and producing a transformation in the system.

> The forces now ascendant appear to be leading toward a global society without a dominant structure of cooperation and conflict-- a polyarchy in which nation-states, subnational groups and transnational special interests and communities would all be vying for the support and loyalty of individuals, and conflicts would have to be resolved primarily on the basis of ad hoc bargaining in a shifting context of power relationships (Brown, 1974: 186).

In anticipation of this transformation, Brown suggests that world community structures will have to be substantially strengthened and "a decisive shift in basic socio-political attitudes toward community--who is responsible for whom, who is accountable to whom--"if man is ever to cope with his dramatically new world.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, long critical of the Administration's foreign policy, joins Brown in trying to alert Washington to the "broad systemic and dynamic crisis."

> In fact, the present crisis has made its (the United States') role more important than at any point in the last 10 years. Thus, the time has come to bury the cliche about the retraction of American power. The central issue today is the redefinition of American power in ways that are relevant to present circumstances. More specifically, the point of departure for an effective U.S. policy must be a clear-headed recognition of the depth and extent of the existing crisis, as well as commensurate institutional and personal realignments in the policy-making processes of the U.S. government (Brzezinski, 1974-75: 66).

The Columbia scholar doubts whether the United States is institutionally prepared to respond to the present state of affairs,-- a "state of social emergency" (Brzezinski, 1974-75: 72). He argues with other analysts that the assumptions undergirding the post-World War II international system are invalid today. Atlantic harmony and European integration and progress can no longer be assumed as synonymous. Progress toward a liberal, free trade system based on fixed monetary rates appears more and more

doubtful, and The monolithic threat of revolutionary powers appears less monolithic, less threatening and less revolutionary. Finally, the less developed nations show signs of surprising unity and assertiveness.

These changes, Brzezinski posits, demand "a major architectural effort rather than an acrobatic foreign policy." The issues placed on the global agenda by these alterations require "cooperation, joint planning and consultation." The inherent dynamic pushes essentially non-political matters to the level of political accommodation and adaptation. U.S. policy makers, if they hope to cope with these problems, should broaden their scope, eliminate the personalization of foreign policy and modernize their conceptual frameworks.

Puchala and Fagan are two additional voices in the chorus heralding decisive changes in international politics: "A number of us currently engaged in the study of international relations sense that international politics have changed structurally, procedurely and substantively during the last ten years." (1974: 249). This change is not viewed as a revolution where the traditional "security paradigm," dominating the most recent era from 1945-1960, is replaced with a contradictory and incompatible one. A more subtle shift has occurred. Security contests are still very active forces, but governments are increasingly preoccupied with "enhancing" the overall welfare of their citizenry through their foreign policies and selected international machinery. This is true because new complexities have arisen in the international system affecting its "structure, process, and substance."

Structurally the system has considerably more active entities controlling or at least significantly influencing foreign affairs. A tremendous proliferation of non-national actors have arisen to place new matters on the global agenda and significantly influence their final disposition. The number of international organizations has grown; the foreign policies of multinational corporations are more prominent and decisive today than ever before, and, the growth of transnational relations has precipitated a new kind of politics (Singer and Wallace, 1970: 239-287; Nye and Keohane, 1972). International interactions are, consequently, more diverse making government to government behavior but one strand of systemic behavior.

Subsystems are politically more active today. Puchala and Fagan reason that this activity appreciably changes the meaning of global politics. Now global politics means that

few events have isolated consequences whereas it once
referred exclusively to the reach of super power politics.
The behavior of states, large and small, proximate and
distant, influence one another. Subsystem politics have not
supplanted the cold war system, a position somewhat at odds
with Brown's views, but it is more analytically appropriate
to view the present system as containing both forces.

Structural complexity is compounded further by new
international processes, namely--integration. By
integration, Puchala and Fagan mean "peaceful transnational
problem solving." (1974: 258). The process involves the use
of foreign policy instruments to achieve peaceful problem
solving. Again Puchala and Fagan do not hold that
integrative processes are replacing competitive ones;
however, they do assert that integration processes are more
frequent and more influential in bilateral relationships
than ever before. The viability of international integrative
processes facilitates regionalism. "In this vein, most
obviously, regionalism is certainly alive and well in the
1970s, in Western Europe where the Six recently became the
Nine, in Central America where a common market arrgreement
seems to have withstood an international war, in South
America where the Andean Group is grasping the development
dilemma by the horns via international cooperation, and in
Africa where the "try, try again" ethic prevails despite any
number of false starts." (Puchala and Fagan, 1974: 258).

The final element of increased international complexity
is the "novelty" achieved in the range of salient
substantive issues. Actors in the system are still assiduous
patrons of power politics, but the new dimensions of welfare
politics have been added to their behavioral inventories.
Puchala and Fagan consider their change in the substance of
world affairs as the core of the systems new complexity. The
change leads the authors to expect governments to view the
behavior of other actors more in economic terms rather than
militarily. Issues about trade, aid and money form the basis
for future inter-actor collaboration or collision. In sum,
questions of national security have moved from the center of
governments focus to center left to allow these nonsecurity
issues to share the limelight.

As Stanley Hoffmann has espied, a changed international
system produces the setting for some very difficult
"choices" (Hoffmann, 1973: 3-42). Under a declining security
dilemma, whether real or imaginary, priorities are revamped,
Third World conflicts are confused, and traditional
explanations of high politics contests become unacceptable.
Asymmetrical multipolarity, shifting attentions from the

Third World to transnational forces and organizations, and
analysts' increasing tendency to focus on bureaucratic
"games" as the source of foreign policy (Allison, 1970;
1971; Allison and Halperin, 1972: 40-79; Halperin, 1971:
70-90; Halperin, 1974,; Neutstadt, 1970; Hilsman, 1967)
depict the new system.

> At the root, there is the displacement of the
> security dilemma; the move from a world dominated
> by a single chessboard--that strategic-diplomatic
> one (which either eclipsed or controlled all
> others)-- to a world dispersed into a variety of
> chessboards. This is partly the result of the
> nuclear stalemate (which has somewhat neutralized
> the strategic chessboard and reduced, if not its
> fundamental importance, at least its daily
> saliency), partly the product of economic and
> social processes and scientific invention in a
> world obsessed by the quest of economic growth
> (Hoffmann, 1973: 5).

Hoffmann anticipated these new chessboards in 1968 (Hoffman,
1968: 10-51; see also Hoffmann, 1970: 389-413). Over the
system's muted bipolarity, its manifest polycentrism and its
emerging layer of multipolarity, Hoffman foresaw a number of
alternate chessboards where the new politics would be played
out. The complexity, diversity and emergence of these new
forces requires, not the grandiose blueprints, which have
guided politics in the past, but moderate, low profile
"gardening."

> Considerable attention has been given to the
observation that the international system is undergoing a
transformation. The different positions reviewed agree that
the importance of the military-security issue is lessening.
Few, if any, observers of contemporary world affairs contend
that national security has become an obsolete issue. More
than likely they would agree with Maxwell Taylor who argues
that the traditional military requirements for national
security continue to have legitimate claims "on national
systems (Taylor, 1974: 579-584). Nevertheless, he recognizes
that traditional rationales may no longer be acceptable.
Publics are generally dissatisfied and unresponsive to the
standard military case for massive military programs, to say
nothing of their growing pessimism about the ability of
military power to resolve the more critical threat
situations. The changes observed above have made national
populations conscious and apprehensive of new, nonmilitary
threats to national life. Today they are more real than the
threat of military aggression. Taylor acknowlwedges this:

"...I for one am fully convinced that the most formidable
threats   to   this   nation   are   in   the   nonmilitary   field"
(Taylor,   1974:   592).   But   the   addendum   to   this
acknowledgement   is   that   these   changes have generated new
threat   situations   likely   to   cause as much turbulence and
disorder   in   the   next   decade   as   in   preceding   ones.
International   crises   are,   therefore,   just   as   likely as
before   because   of   the changes in the structure, processes
and substance of the international system.

An   unsettled   international   system   is   a seedbed for
crises.   To   return   to   Oran   Young's point about political
fluidity   and crises, there can be little doubt but that the
international   setting is ripe, and the conditions conducive
for systemic crises.

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